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Abstract
Modern multi-core processors share cache resources for max-
imum cache utilization and performance gains. However, this
leaves the cache vulnerable to side-channel attacks, where
inherent timing differences in shared cache behavior are ex-
ploited to infer information on the victim’s execution pat-
terns, ultimately leaking private information such as a secret
key. The root cause for these attacks is mutually distrusting
processes sharing the cache entries and accessing them in a
deterministic and consistent manner. Various defenses against
cache side-channel attacks have been proposed. However,
they suffer from serious shortcomings: they either degrade
performance significantly, impose impractical restrictions, or
can only defeat certain classes of these attacks. More im-
portantly, they assume that side-channel-resilient caches are
required for the entire execution workload and do not allow
the possibility to selectively enable the mitigation only for
the security-critical portion of the workload.
We present a generic mechanism for a flexible and soft
partitioning of set-associative caches and propose a hybrid
cache architecture, called HYBCACHE. HYBCACHE can be
configured to selectively apply side-channel-resilient cache
behavior only for isolated execution domains, while providing
the non-isolated execution with conventional cache behavior,
capacity and performance. An isolation domain can include
one or more processes, specific portions of code, or a Trusted
Execution Environment (e.g., SGX or TrustZone). We show
that, with minimal hardware modifications and kernel sup-
port, HYBCACHE can provide side-channel-resilient cache
only for isolated execution with a performance overhead of
3.5–5%, while incurring no performance overhead for the
remaining execution workload. We provide a simulator-based
and hardware implementation of HYBCACHE to evaluate the
performance and area overheads, and show how HYBCACHE
mitigates typical access-based and contention-based cache
attacks.
1 Introduction
For decades now, upcoming processor generations are being
augmented with novel performance-enhancing capabilities.
Performance and security of processor architectures and mi-
croarchitectures are considered exclusively independent de-
sign metrics, with architects primarily focused on the more
tangible performance benefits. However, the recent outbreak
of micro-architectural cross-layer attacks [4–6, 18, 19, 22, 42,
44, 46, 47, 50, 56, 59, 68, 70, 79], has demonstrated the critical
and long-ignored effects of micro-architectural performance
optimizations on systems from a security standpoint. It is be-
coming evident how performance and security are at conflict
with each other unless architects address the design trade-off
early on and not as an afterthought.
One prominent performance feature and the subject of a
wide range of recent architectural attacks is the use of caches
and cache-like structures to provide orders-of-magnitude
faster memory accesses. The intrinsic timing difference be-
tween a cache hit and miss is one of various side channels
that can be exploited by an adversary process via a carefully
crafted side-channel attack to infer the memory access pat-
terns of a victim process [23,25–29,34,35,38,54,61,71,77,78].
Consequently, the adversary can leak unauthorized informa-
tion, such as a private key, hence violating the confidentiality
and isolation of the victim process.
Cache Side-Channel Attacks. In earlier years, cache side-
channel attacks have been shown to compromise crypto-
graphic implementations [8, 54, 61, 78]. More recently, attack
variants such as Prime + Probe [34, 38, 54, 61] and Flush +
Reload attacks [29, 78] are being demonstrated on a much
larger scale. They have been shown to bypass address space
layout randomization (ASLR) [23, 25], infer keystroke behav-
ior [26,27], or leak privacy-sensitive human genome indexing
computation [11], whereby millions of platforms using vari-
ous architectures have been shown vulnerable to such attacks.
The attacks require an adversary to orchestrate particular
cache evictions of target memory addresses of interest and
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after a time interval measure its own memory access latencies
or observe relevant computation and profile how it has been
affected. This enables the adversary to deduce the victim’s
memory access patterns and infer dependent secrets. Cache
side-channel attacks have been shown to exploit core-specific
caches as well as shared last-level caches across different
cores or virtual machines [27,38,54]. Even hardware-security
extensions and trusted execution environments (TEEs) such
as Intel SGX [13, 33] and ARM TrustZone [7] are not im-
mune to these attacks. While they do not claim cache side-
channel security, recent cache side-channel attacks targeting
SGX [11, 21, 60, 66] and TrustZone [49, 80] have been shown
to compromise the acclaimed privacy and isolation guarantees
of these security architectures, thus undermining their very
purpose.
Existing Cache Defenses. To defeat cache side-channel
attacks, there has been extensive research on techniques to
identify and mitigate information leaks in a software’s mem-
ory access patterns [16, 17, 45]. However, mitigating these
leaks efficiently for arbitrary software (beyond cryptographic
implementations) remains impractical and challenging. Alter-
natively, hardware-based and software approaches have been
proposed to modify the cache organization itself to limit cache
interference across different security domains. Examples in-
clude modifying replacement and leveraging inclusion poli-
cies [39,76], as well as approaches that rely on cache partition-
ing [24, 40, 41, 51, 72, 73, 82], and randomization/obfuscation-
based schemes [52, 53, 63, 69, 73] to randomize the relation
between the memory address and its cache set index.
While strict cache partitioning is the intuitive approach
to provide complete cache isolation and non-interference
between mutually distrusting processes, it remains highly
impractical and prevents efficient cache utilization. On the
other hand, randomization-based approaches make the attacks
computationally much more difficult by randomizing the map-
ping of memory addresses to cache sets. However, existing
schemes either require complex management logic, impose
particular restrictions, rely on weak cryptographic functions,
or mitigate only some classes of cache side-channel attacks.
Most importantly, all of the aforementioned schemes are de-
signed to provide side-channel cache protection for the entire
code execution, which is actually not required in practice.
Our Goals. We observe that usually the majority of the
code is not security-critical. Typically, a small portion of the
code is security-critical and requires cache-based side-channel
resilience. Moreover, this security-critical portion of the code
is often already running in an isolated environment, such as
in a TEE or in an isolated process. In these cases, a trusted
component, namely the processor hardware or microcode or
the operating system kernel, enforces this isolation. We aim to
leverage and extend this existing isolation mechanism to also
selectively enable side-channel resilience for the caches only
for the portion of the code that needs it, without reducing the
cache performance for the remaining non-isolated code. In
doing so, we practically address the persistent performance-
security trade-off of caches by providing the system adminis-
trator with a "tuning knob" to configure by balancing and iso-
lating the workload as required. Consequently, s/he can tune
the resulting cache side-channel resilience, utilization, and
performance, while guaranteeing no performance overhead
is incurred on the non-isolated portion of the code execution.
Only the isolated (usually the minority) portion is subject to
a reasonable reduction in cache capacity and performance –
the cost of increased security guarantees.
To achieve this flexible and hybrid cache behavior, we
introduce HYBCACHE, a generic mechanism that protects iso-
lated code from cache side-channel attacks without reducing
the cache performance for the remaining non-isolated code.
In HYBCACHE, isolated execution only uses a pre-defined
(small) number of cache ways1 in each set of a set-associative
cache. It uses these ways fully-associatively, while for evic-
tion random victim cache lines are selected to be replaced
by new ones, thus breaking the set-associativity and remov-
ing the root cause of access leakage. Non-isolated execution
uses all cache ways set-associatively as usual, without any
performance overhead. While isolated and non-isolated exe-
cution may compete for the use of some ways in the cache,
the random replacement policy and fully-associative mapping
used by the isolated execution prevent leaking information
about the accessed memory locations (and their cache set
mapping) to the non-isolated execution, thus making the pre-
computation and construction of an eviction set impossible.
Moreover, HYBCACHE flexibly supports multiple, mutually
distrusting isolated execution domains while preserving the
above security guarantees individually for each domain.
HYBCACHE is architecture-agnostic, and can be seam-
lessly integrated with any isolation mechanism (TEEs or inter-
process isolation); the definition of the isolation domains and
the distribution of the workload is left up to the system admin-
istrator. HYBCACHE is backward compatible by design; it
provides conventional set-associative caches for the workload
if the side-channel resilience feature is not supported.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are as
follows.
• We present HYBCACHE, the first cache architecture de-
signed to provide flexible configuration of cache side-
channel resilience by selectively enabling it for isolated
execution without degrading the performance and avail-
able cache capacity of non-isolated execution.
• We evaluate the performance overhead of a simulator-
based implementation of HYBCACHE and show that it
is less than 5% for the SPEC2006 benchmarks suite,
1Ways are different available entries in a cache set to which a particular
memory address can be allocated.
and estimate the memory and area overheads of a cycle-
accurate hardware implementation of HYBCACHE.
• We show – through our security analysis – how breaking
set-associative mapping and shared cache lines between
mutually distrusting isolation domains (which are the
root causes for typical cache side-channel attacks besides
the intrinsic cache sharing and competition) mitigates
typical contention-based and access-based cache attacks.
2 Cache Organization, Attacks and Defenses
We briefly present the typical cache organization, as well as
recent cache side-channel attacks that are within the scope of
our work, and limitations of existing defenses.
2.1 Cache Organization
Cache Structure. Caches are typically arranged in a hi-
erarchy of fastest/closest/smallest to slowest/furthest/largest
levels of cache, respectively L1, L2, and L3 cache/last-level-
cache (LLC). Each core incorporates its L1 and L2 caches and
shares the LLC with other on-chip cores. A cache consists of
the storage of the actual cached data/instructions and the tag
bits of their corresponding memory addresses. Cache memory
is organized into fixed-size memory blocks, called cache lines
each of size B bytes. Set-associative caches are organized
into S sets of W ways each (called a W-way set-associative
cache) where each way can be used to store a cache line. A
single cache line can only be allocated to only one of the
cache sets, but can occupy any of the ways within this cache
set. The least significant log2 B bits are the block offset bits
that indicate which byte block within the B-Byte cache line
is requested. The next log2 S bits are the index bits used to
locate the correct cache set. The remaining most significant
bits are the tag bits for each cache line.
In a set-associative cache, once the cache set of a requested
address is located, the tag bits of the address are matched
against the tags of the cache lines in the set to identify if it is
a cache hit. If no match is found, then it is a miss at this cache
level, and the request is sent down to the next lower-level
cache in the hierarchy until the requested cache line is found
or fetched from main memory (cache miss). However, in a
fully-associative cache, a cache line can be placed in any of
the cache ways where the entire cache serves as one set. No
index bits are required, but only log2 B block offset bits and
the rest of the bits serve as tag bits.
Eviction and Replacement. Due to set-associativity and
limited cache capacity, cache contention and capacity misses
occur where a cache line must be evicted in favor of the
new cache line. Which cache line to evict depends on the
replacement policy deployed, some of which include First-in-
First-Out (FIFO), Least-Recently-Used (LRU), pseudo-LRU,
Least-Frequently-Used (LFU), Not-Recently-Used (NRU),
random and pseudo-random replacement policies. In practice,
approximations to LRU (pseudo-LRU) and random replace-
ment (pseudo-random) are usually deployed.
2.2 Cache Side-Channel Attacks
Cache side-channel attacks pose a critical threat to trusted
computing and underlie more proliferating side-channel at-
tacks such as the Spectre [44] and Meltdown [50] vari-
ants. Different classes of these attacks have been demon-
strated on all platforms and architectures ranging from mo-
bile and embedded devices [49] to server computing sys-
tems [34, 54, 81]. They have also been shown to undermine
the isolation guarantees of trusted execution environments,
like Intel SGX [11, 21, 60, 66] and ARM TrustZone [49, 80].
Such attacks have been shown to infer both fine-grained and
coarse-grained private data and operations, such as bypass-
ing address space layout randomization (ASLR) [23, 25],
inferring keystroke behavior [26, 27], or leaking privacy-
sensitive human genome indexing computation [11], as well
as RSA [54, 81] and AES [10, 34] decryption keys.
Cache side-channel attacks exploit the inherent leakage
resulting from the timing latency difference between cache
hits and misses. This is then used to infer privacy/security-
critical information about the victim’s execution. In an offline
phase, the attacker must first identify the target addresses of
interest (by means of static and dynamic code analysis of
the victim program) whose access patterns leak the desired
information about the victim’s execution, such as a private
encryption key. In an online phase, the attacker measures
the timing latency of its memory accesses or the victim’s
computation time to infer the desired information.
To demonstrate how a simple cache attack works, consider
the pseudo-code of the Montgomery ladder implementation
for the modular exponentiation algorithm shown in Algo-
rithm 1. Modular exponentiation is the operation of raising a
number b to the exponent e modulo m to compute be mod m
and is used in many encryption algorithms such as RSA. Leak-
ing the exponent e may reveal the private key. As shown in
Algorithm 1, the operations performed for each of the expo-
nent bits directly correspond to the value of the bit. If the
exponent bit is a zero, the instruction in Line 5 is executed.
If the exponent bit is a one, the instruction in Line 9 is exe-
cuted. An attacker that can observe or deduce these execution
patterns can thus disclose the value of each corresponding ex-
ponent bit, and eventually recover the encryption key [78, 81].
S/he, however, needs to identify the target addresses that need
to be observed (the addresses of the instructions in Lines 5
and 9 in this example) in the victim program and accordingly
construct the eviction set. The eviction set is a collection of
addresses that are mapped to the same specific cache set to
which the target addresses are also mapped. The attacker uses
this eviction set to evict the contents of the whole set in the
cache, and therefore guarantee to successfully evict the target
addresses from the caches. Consequently, s/he measures the
timing latency of its own memory accesses after a time in-
terval to deduce whether the victim has accessed these target
addresses.
Algorithm 1: Montgomery Ladder RSA Implementation
Input: base b, modulo m, exponent e = (en−1...e0)2
Output: be mod m
1 R0 ← 1; R1 ← b;
2 for i from n-1 downto 0 do
3 if ei = 0 then
4 R1 ← R0 × R1 mod m;
5 R0 ← R0 × R0 mod m;
6 end
7 if ei = 1 then
8 R0 ← R0 × R1 mod m;
9 R1 ← R1 × R1 mod m;
10 end
11 end
12 return R0;
The online phase of these attacks consists of three main
steps: Eviction, Waiting and Analysis. The attacker uses the
eviction set to evict the victim’s target addresses from the
cache. Next, the attacker waits an interval of time to allow
the victim to access the target addresses. Then the attacker
measures and analyzes its access time measurements to de-
termine if the victim has accessed the target addresses. This
is repeated as many times as the attacker requires to collect
sufficient traces to recover the exponent bits.
The different techniques used by the attacker to perform
the eviction can be classified into two main approaches, either
access-based or contention-based. In access-based attacks
such as Flush + Reload [29, 78], Flush + Flush [26], Invali-
date + Transfer [35], and Flush + Prefetch [25], the attacker
accesses the target addresses directly by flushing them out
of the cache using the dedicated clflush instruction [2] and
possibly exploiting timing leakage from the execution of the
clflush instruction [26]. This invalidates the lines containing
these addresses and writes them back to memory. Evict +
Reload [27] attacks have also been shown which do not re-
quire the clflush instruction, but instead evict specific cache
sets by accessing physically congruent addresses. These at-
tacks are only feasible in case of shared memory pages be-
tween the attacker and victim, usually in the form of shared
libraries. Otherwise, an attacker resorts to contention-based
attacks such as Prime + Probe [34, 38, 54, 61, 77], Prime +
Abort [15], Evict + Time [23, 61], alias-driven attacks [28],
and indirect Memory Management Unit (MMU)-based cache
attacks [71], where s/he constructs an eviction set and uses it
to trigger and exploit a cache contention in the same cache set
as the target addresses, thus evicting cache lines containing
the target addresses from the pertinent cache set.
The waiting interval should be selected and synchronized
such that the victim is expected to access the target address
at least once before the attacker analyzes the collected obser-
vations. By analyzing the collected observations, the attacker
determines whether the target address was indeed accessed by
the victim. This is achieved by different techniques depend-
ing on the attack approach, either the adversary measures the
overall time needed by the victim process to perform certain
computations [8, 10], or probes the cache with eviction sets
and profiles cache activity to deduce which memory addresses
were accessed [34, 38, 54, 77, 78], or accesses target memory
addresses and measures the timing of these individual ac-
cesses [29, 61]. Alternatively, the adversary can also read
values of addresses from the main memory to see whether
cache lines that contain cacheable target addresses have been
evicted to memory [28].
Cache-collision timing attacks exploit cache collisions that
the victim experiences due to its cache utilization, e.g., after
a sequence of lookups performed by a table-driven software
implementation of an encryption scheme, such as AES [10].
These attacks are out of scope in this work since they are not
common, are specific to certain software implementations,
and can only be mitigated by adapting the implementation or
locking the relevant cache lines after pre-loading them.
2.3 Limitations of Existing Defenses
To mitigate these attacks, software-based countermeasures
and modified cache architectures have been proposed in re-
cent years, which we cover in depth in the Related Work
(Section 8). These can be classified into two main paradigms:
1) applying cache partitioning to provide strict isolation, or
2) applying randomization or noise to make the attacks com-
putationally impractical. However, all proposed countermea-
sures to date either impact performance significantly, require
explicit programmer’s annotations, are not seamlessly com-
patible with existing software requirements such as the use
of shared libraries, are architecture-specific, or do not defend
against all classes of attacks. Most importantly, all existing
defenses apply their side-channel cache protection for the
entire execution workload.
In practice, cache side-channel resilience is only required
for the security-critical (usually smaller) portion of the work-
load that is allocated to execute in isolation. Thus, non-
isolated execution should not suffer any resulting performance
costs. To address this in this work, we propose a modified
hybrid cache microarchitecture that enables side-channel re-
silience only for the isolated portion of execution, while re-
taining the conventional cache behavior and performance for
the non-isolated execution.
3 Adversary Model and Assumptions
To provide side-channel-resilient cache accesses for only
security-critical isolated execution, we propose a hybrid soft
partitioning scheme for set-associative memory structures.
In this work, we apply it to caches and call it HYBCACHE.
HYBCACHE aims to provide cache-based side-channel re-
silience to the security-critical or privacy-sensitive workload
that is allocated to one or more Isolated Execution Domains
(I-Domains), while maintaining conventional cache behavior
for non-critical execution that is allocated to the Non-Isolated
Execution Domain (NI-Domain). HYBCACHE assumes an
adversary capable of mounting the attacks described in Sec-
tion 2.2 and is designed to mitigate them.
Furthermore, the construction of HYBCACHE is based on
the following assumptions:
A1 Security-critical code that requires side-channel re-
silience is already allocated to an isolated component,
like a process or a TEE (enclave).
A recent trend in the design of complex applications, like web
browsers, is to compartmentalize them using multiple pro-
cesses. As an example, all major browsers spawn a dedicated
process for every tab [43] and some even use a dedicated pro-
cess to better isolate privileged components [58]. Similarly,
the widespread availability of TEEs, like SGX, encourages
developers to encapsulate sensitive components of their code
in protected environments.
A2 Isolated execution is the minority of the workload.
Isolation works best when the isolated component is as small
as possible, thus reducing the attack surface. This complies
with the intended usage of TEEs like SGX where only small
sensitive components of the code would be allocated to the
TEE. Hence, we assume only the minority of the workload
needs to be isolated. HYBCACHE still provides the same
security guarantees if the majority of the workload is isolated,
but the performance of the isolated execution would suffer.
A3 Sensitive code only uses writable shared memory for I/O
(if at all), and access patterns to this shared memory do
not leak any information.
Isolated code should focus on processing some local data,
while I/O needs should be limited to copying the input(s)
into the isolated component, and copying the output(s) out
of the component. Both of these procedures just access the
data sequentially; thus, the access patterns during I/O do not
depend on the data and does not leak any information.
A4 The attacker is not in the same I-Domain as the victim.
HYBCACHE is designed to isolate mutually distrusting I-
Domains and thus, we must assume the attacker and the vic-
tim are not in the same I-Domain. Note that, as a consequence
of A3, if a process handles sensitive data and has multiple
threads, they must all be in the same I-Domain, since they
share the entire address space. In cases where isolation be-
tween threads sharing the same address space is also required,
HYBCACHE can, in principle, provide intra-process isolation
as discussed later in Section 7.
4 Hybrid Cache (HYBCACHE)
We systematically analyzed existing contention-based and
access-based cache attacks in the literature (Section 2.2) to
identify their common root causes (besides the intrinsic shar-
ing of cache entries and latency difference between a cache
hit and miss). Cache side-channel attacks are, by nature, very
specific to the victim program and may exploit attack-specific
features such as the side-channel leakage of the clflush [26]
or prefetch instructions [25]. Nevertheless, each one of these
attacks is primarily caused by one or both of the following
root causes: shared memory pages (and cache lines) between
mutually distrusting code, and deterministic and fixed set-
associativity of cache structures, which enables targeted cache
set contention by pre-computed eviction sets.
4.1 Requirements Derivation
In light of the above, HYBCACHE should provide side-
channel resilience between different isolation domains with
respect to their cache utilization. An adversary process shar-
ing the cache with a victim process should not be able to
distinguish which memory locations a victim accesses. Nev-
ertheless, we emphasize that the only approach to enforce
complete non-interference between different domains is by
strict static cache partitioning, such that no cache resources
are shared, and thus zero information leakage occurs. On
the other hand, this is impractical, and results in inefficient
cache utilization from a performance standpoint. Our key
objective in this work is to practically address and accommo-
date this persistent performance/security trade-off of cache
structures by providing sufficiently strong cache side-channel-
resilience, such that practical and typical cache side-channel
attacks become effectively infeasible without necessarily en-
forcing complete non-interference. Additionally, we desire
that this security guarantee is run-time configurable, such that
it is only in effect when required.
This builds on our insight that it is neither practical nor
required to provide cache side-channel resilience for all the
code in the workload. This additional security guarantee is
only required for security-critical execution, which is a mi-
nority of the workload (Assumption A2), and usually isolated
in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (Assumption A1).
Thus, we require to provide a cache architecture that provides
non-isolated execution with conventional cache utilization
(with no performance costs), and simultaneously side-channel-
resilient cache utilization (with a tolerable performance degra-
dation) only for the smaller portion of the execution workload
that is security-sensitive and isolated. We also require that
our architecture is portable, can be easily deployed, and is
backward compatible when a system does not support it. We
summarize these requirements below:
R1 Strong side-channel resilience guarantees between the
isolated and non-isolated execution domains, sufficient to
thwart typical contention-based and access-based cache
attacks
R2 Dynamic and scalable cache isolation between multiple
different isolation domains
R3 Addressing the cache performance/security trade-off by
configuring the non-isolated/isolated workload balance
(compliant with how TEEs are intended and designed to
be used) such that the performance of the non-isolated
execution workload is not degraded
R4 Usability: backward-compatible, architecture-agnostic,
no usage restrictions and no code modifications required
Next, we present the high-level construction of HYBCACHE
in Section 4.2 and its microarchitecture in more detail in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
4.2 High-Level Idea
In HYBCACHE, a subset of the cache, named subcache, is re-
served to form an orthogonal isolated cache structure. Specif-
ically, nisolated cache ways within the conventional cache sets
form the subcache. While these subcache ways are available
for the NI-Domain to utilize, the I-Domains are restricted to
utilize only these subcache ways. However, the I-Domains
utilize this subcache in a fully-associative way and using
a random-replacement policy. In doing so, all mutually dis-
trusting processes executing in the I-Domains can share the
subcache without leaking information on the actual mem-
ory locations they access. Since these subcache ways are
not reserved exclusively for isolated execution and can also
be utilized by non-isolated execution with least priority, the
NI-Domain still retains unaltered cache capacity usage and
non-degraded performance.
The key purpose of HYBCACHE, unlike existing defenses,
is to selectively enable side-channel-resilient cache utilization
only for the I-Domains. Hence, only the isolated execution is
subjected to the resulting performance overhead, while still
maintaining conventional cache behavior and performance for
the NI-Domain, as outlined in Requirement R3. We describe
next the architecture of HYBCACHE and how it achieves this.
4.3 Controller Algorithm
HYBCACHE modifies how memory lines are mapped to cache
entries for the I-Domains. nisolated ways (at least a way in each
set) of the conventional set-associative cache are designated
to the orthogonal subcache. Cache lines are mapped fully-
associatively to the subcache entries and evicted and replaced
in the subcache using a random replacement policy. This
means that a given memory line can be cached in any of the
nisolated entries. This breaks the deterministic link between
memory addresses and their corresponding cache locations,
thus defeating an attacker that attempts to infer the victim’s
memory accesses by triggering and observing contention in a
particular cache set.
Figure 1 illustrates how the HYBCACHE controller man-
ages cache requests. HYBCACHE supports multi-core proces-
sors with simultaneous multithreading (SMT) and assumes
that each process is assigned an IsolationDomainID (IDID)
that identifies whether the process is in an I-Domain (and
which isolation domain) or in the NI-Domain. Any incoming
cache request is accompanied by the IDID of the issuing pro-
cess. In A , HYBCACHE controller queries the IDID of the
cache request and the request is serviced accordingly. If it is
in the NI-Domain, the complete cache is queried convention-
ally using the set index and tag bits of the requested address
to locate the cache set and line respectively ( B & C ). If a
match is found, the controller checks whether the cache line
was found in one of the subcache ways in D . Recall that
these ways are not reserved exclusively for isolated execution,
i.e., they can be used by non-isolated execution but with least
priority in case a cache set becomes over-utilized. Therefore,
if a matching cache line is found in one of these ways, the
controller checks whether it was cached by an isolated or non-
isolated process ( E ). The requesting process can only hit and
access the cache line if that line was placed by a process in
the NI-Domain. Otherwise, it is not allowed to hit on it.
Checks in the controller are implemented to occur in par-
allel, i.e., all cache hits are generated in the same number of
clock cycles (as well as cache misses), to eliminate respective
timing side channels. In case of a cache miss, the memory
block is fetched from main memory and cached in F . The
eviction and replacement are performed according to the de-
ployed policy. All ways are available for eviction, including
the subcache ways to provide the NI-Domain execution with
unaltered cache capacity. However, the usage of the subcache
ways by the I-Domains is considered while recording the re-
cency of accesses to the cache ways to make it least likely
to evict a line from one of the subcache ways if it is recently
used by an I-Domain process.
If the cache request is issued by an I-Domain process, it is
serviced by querying only the subcache ( G ). The subcache
deploys fully-associative mapping, and is thus queried by a
lookup of all the ways using the (cache line address bits -
block offset bits) as tag bits ( H ) and simultaneously query-
ing that the line belongs to an I-Domain (since these ways
may also be used by the NI-Domain) and that it was placed
by a process with the same IDID ( I ). Otherwise, a cache
miss occurs. Disallowing I-Domain processes from hitting on
cache lines originally placed by processes in other I-Domains
provides dynamic isolation between an unlimited number of
mutually distrusting processes that share memory. In case of
a miss, any of the subcache ways is randomly selected and
its cache line is evicted and replaced by the memory block
fetched from main memory ( J ). The random replacement
policy considers all subcache ways equally, even those occu-
pied by the NI-Domain cache lines.
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cache request
non-isolated
isolated
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FIGURE 1: HYBCACHE controller policy
4.4 Hardware Microarchitecture
Figure 2 shows how HYBCACHE could be applied for a con-
ventional cache hierarchy of a multi-core processor. The cache
capacity available for the NI-Domain execution is unaltered,
i.e., the conventional set-associative cache with all its sets and
ways can be utilized by the NI-Domain.
At each cache level, way-based partitioning is used to re-
serve at least a way in each set (gray ways in Figure 2). These
ways, combined, form the orthogonal subcache that the I-
Domain execution is restricted to use. However, these sub-
cache ways are not used exclusively by the I-Domain execu-
tion, i.e., the NI-Domain execution may use these ways in
case a corresponding set is fully utilized and the least-recently-
used (LRU) replacement algorithm requires to evict a cache
line from a subcache way in this set. This ensures that the NI-
Domain execution is provided with unaltered cache capacity
and does not suffer performance degradation.
The subcache is fully-associative and deploys random re-
placement policy, i.e., a given memory block is always equally
likely to be cached in any of the available ways. This breaks
set-associativity and provides randomization-based dynamic
isolation between different I-Domains while allowing flexible
sharing of the subcache depending on the run-time utilization
requirements of the isolated execution domains. Using the
subcache fully-associatively further maximizes the utilization
of its limited hardwired capacity.
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FIGURE 2: HYBCACHE hierarchy and organization
The nisolated ways that form the subcache are configured
(hardwired) at design-time and cannot change at run-time,
because these ways are members of both the primary cache as
well as the subcache as shown in Figure 3. It is not feasible to
make nisolated run-time configurable, as this would require that
all the ways are unreasonably wired in both a fully-associative
and set-associative organization. Thus, only a small subset
of nisolated ways (dark gray ways in Figure 3) is selected to
form the subcache. Each of the subcache ways is augmented
with IsolationDomainID (IDID) configuration bits to iden-
tify the isolation domain that placed an occupying cache line
in the pertinent way. To provide any cache isolation at the
microarchitectural level, a mechanism to bind owners/tags to
cache lines is required, thus IDIDs are needed. We chose to
configure 4 bits for the IDID, thus supporting 16 concurrent
isolation domains, where an all-zero indicates the NI-Domain.
The number of bits allocated in HYBCACHE for IDID is a
hardware design decision. Increasing the number of desig-
nated bits would increase the number of maximum concurrent
isolation domains that HYBCACHE can support. However,
other metrics such as area overhead and power consumption
come into play in this design trade-off.
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Cache way
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FIGURE 3: HYBCACHE hardware microarchitecture
The subcache ways are augmented with an extended tag
bits storage (dashed dark gray tag bits of the dark gray ways
in Figure 3). When queried fully-associatively (for the I-
Domains), all bits, except the offset bits (6 bits for byte-
addressable 64B cache line), of the requested address are
compared with the extended tag bits of the subcache ways
to locate a matching cache line. For the NI-Domain, the sub-
cache ways are queried set-associatively with the rest of the
cache (conventionally), where the request tag bits are com-
pared only with the non-extended tag bits of the subcache
ways within the located cache set.
4.5 Software Configuration
Abstraction and Transparency. The hardware modifica-
tions required for HYBCACHE are transparent to the software
and abstracted from it. The trusted software (or hardware)
component of the incorporating platform is only required to
interface with the HYBCACHE controller to communicate the
isolation domain of each incoming cache request. However,
HYBCACHE does not stipulate or restrict how these isolation
domains are defined and communicated, thus leaving it to the
discretion of the system designer to identify how HYBCACHE
can be integrated with the comprising architecture.
Isolated Execution. HYBCACHE enables the dynamic iso-
lation of the cache utilization of different isolation domains
by using the IDID of the process that issues the cache request
being serviced. The means by which the isolation domains
are defined, generated, and communicated is dependent on
how the trusted execution and isolation is deployed. We de-
sign HYBCACHE such that it is seamlessly compliant with
any trusted execution environment (TEE) where isolation do-
mains (across different processes, cores, containers, or virtual
machines (VMs)) are either software-defined by a trusted OS
(thus requiring kernel support) or hardware/firmware-defined
in case the OS is not trusted (such as in SGX). Different isola-
tion domains can be defined across different isolated address
space ranges such as in SGX enclaves, across processes such
as in TrustZone normal/secure worlds or by standard inter-
process isolation, or even across different groups of processes
or different virtual machines.
HYBCACHE is agnostic to the means of defining the IDIDs
of different isolation domains, and complements any form
of isolated execution environment in place to provide it with
cache side-channel resilience. If the kernel is trusted, kernel
support is required to assign an IDID (or an all-zero IDID for
a non-isolated process) to each process according to its isola-
tion domain. The IDID bits can be added as an additional pro-
cess attribute in each process’s process control block (PCB).
Otherwise, the trusted hardware or firmware would assign the
isolation domains. HYBCACHE assumes that some mecha-
nism of isolation is already enforced for security-critical code
that it can leverage to provide the cache-level isolation. We
argue why this is reasonable in Assumption A1. Neverthe-
less, if this is not the case, then isolation domains need to
be explicitly defined by the developer if s/he wishes to pro-
tect particular code against cache-based side-channel attacks.
While HYBCACHE is focused on protecting user code, in prin-
ciple, kernel code can also be protected by allocating it to an
isolation domain.
Backward Compatibility. Similar to processor supplemen-
tary capabilities such as Page Attribute Tables (PATs) and
Memory Type Range Register (MTRR) for x86, HYBCACHE
supports providing side-channel-resilience on-demand while
retaining backward compatibility. HYBCACHE only effec-
tively provides side-channel resilience for the cache utilization
of execution when processes are assigned different IDIDs that
are communicated with each cache request. Otherwise, from
a software perspective, HYBCACHE is identical to a conven-
tional cache architecture. If no isolation domains are assigned
to the different processes by the trusted kernel or trusted hard-
ware, HYBCACHE is designed to assign an all-zero IDID by
default to incoming cache requests and all execution is treated
as non-isolated (see Figure 1) with cache-based side-channel
resilience disabled. Only when kernel support is provided
(or trusted hardware or firmware in case of SGX) does HY-
BCACHE behave differently for different isolation domains
and provides its side-channel resilience capability.
Shared Memory Support. HYBCACHE supports, by de-
sign, that different isolation domains can share read-only
memory, usually in the form of shared code libraries, without
sharing the corresponding cache lines. This results in having
multiple copies of the shared memory kept in cache (multiple
cache entries), enforcing that cache entries are not shared be-
tween mutually distrusting code. Data coherence is also not a
problem, in this case, since this is read-only memory. We elab-
orate in Section 5 how this effectively mitigates access-based
side-channel attacks.
Conventional access to shared writable memory, on the
other hand, between different isolation domains is disallowed
by design in HYBCACHE, as this makes the victim pro-
cess vulnerable to access-based attacks and would under-
mine cache coherence. In order to provide input and output
functionality to isolated code, HYBCACHE provides special
I/O move instructions. These allow code in an I-Domain to
transfer data between a CPU register and a memory region
(assigned an all-zero IDID when cached) that is designated
exclusively for shared memory between processes belonging
to different I-Domains. These special instructions are meant
to be used to transfer data between domains only through this
designated memory. In practice, we expect them to be used
only in frameworks like the SGX SDK or a trusted kernel. If
code in an I-Domain incorrectly accesses this memory region
using regular instructions, or accesses its own memory using
these special instructions, this could be disallowed, i.e., de-
tected and blocked by the hardware or microcode, e.g., the
MMU. This prevents inserting duplicated writable cache en-
tries which can disrupt cache coherency, while ensuring that
HYBCACHE’s security guarantees still apply to any access
performed using regular instructions.
5 Security Analysis
In the following, we evaluate the effectiveness of HYBCACHE
with respect to the security requirements we outlined in Sec-
tion 4.1. We show that HYBCACHE achieves these security
guarantees by mitigating the following leakages:
S1 Malicious software running in an I-Domain or NI-Domain
cannot flush or perform a cache hit on a cache line belong-
ing to a different I-Domain.
S2 Malicious software running in an I-Domain or NI-Domain
cannot pre-compute and construct an eviction set that
selectively evicts a non-trivial subset of the cache lines
belonging to a different I-Domain. Moreover, the set of
the attacker’s cache lines which can be evicted by the
victim’s lines does not depend on the addresses accessed
by the victim.
S3 Cache hits generated by software in an I-Domain cannot
be observed by software running in a different I-Domain
or NI-Domain. Cache misses generated by software in
an I-Domain can still be indirectly observed by mali-
cious software running in a different I-Domain or NI-
Domain, but the malicious software learns no information
(e.g., memory address) about the access besides whether
a cache miss has occurred.
5.1 S1: Absence of Direct Access to Cache
Lines
Access-based attacks, like Flush + Reload [29, 78], Flush +
Flush [26], Invalidate + Transfer [35], Flush + Prefetch [25],
and Evict + Reload [27], require the attacker to have direct
access to the victim’s cache lines, normally as a result of
shared memory between processes (e.g., shared libraries).
As an example, Flush + Reload works by flushing shared
cache lines and monitoring which lines the victim accesses
and brings back into the cache. HYBCACHE mitigates this
class of attacks by preventing shared cache lines between the
attacker and victim, as we explain in the following.
Shared Read-Only Memory. Read-only memory is shared
between different processes in case of shared code libraries.
HYBCACHE provides support for shared read-only memory
(Section 4.5), while fundamentally disallowing that any cache
line is shared across different I-Domains. Execution within
one domain can only access cache lines brought into the cache
by the same domain. Separate (potentially duplicate) cache
lines are maintained for each domain; flushing and reloading
cache lines only impacts those owned by the attacker’s do-
main and cannot influence any other I-Domain or leak any
information on its cache lines. Having duplicate cache lines
for read-only memory pages does not disturb cache coherency
because it is read-only.
Shared Writable Memory. Shared writable memory be-
tween mutually distrusting domains is disallowed by design
with HYBCACHE. Code in an I-Domain can only exchange
data with another isolation domain through the special I/O
move instructions, which transfer data between the CPU reg-
isters and memory in the NI-Domain that is designated for
shared communication (see Section 4.5). Incorrect usage of
those instructions or incorrect access to this designated mem-
ory region could be detected and blocked by the MMU to
prevent potential cache coherency disruption due to dupli-
cate writable cache entries. However, HYBCACHE still en-
forces that every cache line only belongs to one domain. Since
cache lines always belong to one specific I-Domain or the
NI-Domain, code in a domain cannot flush or perform a cache
hit on a different domain’s cache lines (S1), and attacks that
rely on those capabilities are thus impossible.
5.2 S2: Impossibility of Pre-Computed Evic-
tion Set Construction
Without direct access to the victim’s cache lines, attackers
resort to contention-based attacks, like Prime + Probe [34, 38,
54, 61, 77], Prime + Abort [15], and Evict + Time [23, 61].
In these attacks, the attacker pre-computes and constructs an
eviction set which ensures eviction of a specific subset of the
victim’s cache lines, e.g., lines that belong to a specific set in
a set-associative cache. The attacker process first accesses the
whole eviction set, thus ensuring the victim’s cache lines are
evicted. After a waiting interval, it then checks if its whole
eviction set is still in cache by timing its own memory ac-
cesses to this set, thus detecting if the victim accessed any of
the cache lines of interest. For a conventional set-associative
cache, this is possible because of a fixed set-indexing, which
can be directly determined from the target address of interest.
HYBCACHE protects I-Domains from such attacks by dis-
abling the set-associativity of the reserved subcache entries
when they are used by isolated execution: when a memory ad-
dress is accessed by the isolated victim process, the cache line
will be stored in any entry chosen randomly from the whole
subcache and not from a specific set. The random replacement
policy for isolated execution ensures that any of the subcache
entries is chosen using a discrete uniform distribution, i.e.,
with an equal and independent probability every time, so the
attacker has no means of identifying deterministically and
reproducibly which cache set (or entry) will be used to cache
a particular memory access of the victim. In order to ensure
that a specific cache line of the victim is evicted, the attacker
can only evict all lines in the subcache, but s/he cannot se-
lectively evict a non-trivial subset of the victim’s cache lines.
Moreover, the set of the attacker’s cache lines which can be
evicted by the victim’s lines does not depend on the addresses
accessed by the victim (S2). As a consequence, attacks that
rely on these capabilities are no longer possible. This holds
whether the attacker process is running in an I-Domain or
NI-Domain, as long as the victim process is in an I-Domain
(Requirements R1 and R2).
5.3 S3: Observable Cache Events
Software running in an I-Domain can only hit on cache lines
belonging to the same I-Domain. These cache hits generate
no changes to the cache state, thus, they are unobservable by
an attacker in a different I-Domain or in the NI-Domain.
Cache misses generated by software in an I-Domain evict a
random cache line, which may belong to a different I-Domain
or the NI-Domain. Malicious attacker code can then periodi-
cally observe how many of its lines are evicted and infer the
number of cache misses the victim process is experiencing.
The attacker can further use this information to infer the size
of the victim’s working set, i.e., the number of cache lines in
the subcache currently belonging to the victim.
This cache occupancy channel is the only side-channel
leakage that is not mitigated by the HYBCACHE construc-
tion, which is inherently available in any cache architecture
where the attacker and the victim processes compete for en-
tries in shared cache resources. It can only be effectively
blocked by strict cache partitioning, which we deliberately
do not provide in the HYBCACHE construction. This allows
different isolation domains to still compete for cache entries,
thus preserving maximum and dynamic cache utilization and
unaffected performance for non-isolated execution, as our per-
formance evaluation shows in Section 6.1. Note that, due to
S2, the information inferred by the attacker from observing
this remaining leakage, is effectively reduced to only knowing
the working set size at any point in time.
Leveraging this side channel to infer further information
and mount an attack in typical settings is not trivial. The vic-
tim may evict its own lines when it experiences cache misses
due to the random replacement policy. This would not effect
a difference in the cache state for the attacker, which compli-
cates the attacker’s bookkeeping. Moreover, observations are
severely hindered when any other software is concurrently
running besides the attacker and the victim processes. Finally,
standard software hardening techniques can be applied to
mitigate attacks to code implementations that are particularly
sensitive to this attack. Furthermore, exploiting this side chan-
nel to leak data has not been shown in practice. A recent
attack [67] leverages the cache occupancy side channel to
infer which website is open in a different browser tab (under
the strong assumption that no other tabs are open); however,
it does not leak any user data. Cache activity masking is
suggested as one of the countermeasures to the attack. Imple-
menting cache activity masking for HYBCACHE is feasible
and independent of our cache architecture.
Since the attacker aims to maximize its information and
cannot observe cache hits, s/he can attempt to evict all sub-
cache entries in order to maximize the number of misses expe-
rienced by the victim. As we discuss later, evicting the whole
subcache takes time for an attacker in either the NI-Domain
or in a I-Domain. An unprivileged attacker is unable to pause
the victim’s execution; thus, the attacker can only measure the
cache usage with limited granularity. However, a privileged
adversary, like a malicious OS in the case of an SGX enclave,
can stop and restart the victim arbitrarily and leverage tools
like SGX-Step [12] to observe the victim’s cache usage with
fine granularity. HYBCACHE does not mitigate such an attack
by construction. However, mitigating it is only possible by
strict cache partitioning and the resulting performance costs.
We emphasize that we make an intentional design decision
in HYBCACHE to allow isolation domains to dynamically
compete for cache entries for maximum cache utilization and
unaffected performance for non-isolated execution. A HYB-
CACHE construction that dynamically allocates a dedicated
subcache for each isolation domain would block this leakage
and mitigate attacks that rely on it.
Non-isolated Attacker Process. If the attacker process is
in the NI-Domain, in order to guarantee eviction of the whole
subcache it must fill up all ways in every cache set, includ-
ing the subcache ways. Therefore, the attacker process must
construct an eviction set that is as large as the entire cache
capacity. A typical data L1 cache holds 512 cache entries.
In our experiments, probing (accessing and measuring ac-
cess latencies) of 512 cache lines takes approximately 30 000
CPU cycles, i.e., a little over 8 µs.2 For larger caches, such
as the LLC, it is not even feasible to mount Prime+Probe
attacks by probing the entire cache. The adversary is required
to pinpoint a few cache sets that correspond to the relevant
security-critical accesses made by the victim and monitor
these only [54].
Isolated Attacker Process. If the adversary is in a differ-
ent I-Domain than the victim process, it still cannot control
cache eviction of particular target addresses specifically. Both
attacker and victim processes are isolated and can only use
the subcache ways. Thus, an adversary aiming to perform
controlled eviction can only try to evict the entire subcache.
Because the subcache is fully-associative with random re-
placement, evicting the entire subcache requires an eviction
set much larger than the subcache capacity. We argue below
that this is not easier than probing the entire L1 cache (in
case the attacker is non-isolated), for instance, even though
the subcache is significantly smaller. Moreover, it can be only
guaranteed up to a certain level of probabilistic confidence.
This can be represented statistically by the coupon collector’s
problem, where coupons are represented by entries in the sub-
cache. Let Naccesses be the total number of accesses needed
to evict all the subcache entries n and ni be the number of
accesses needed to evict the i-th way after i-1 ways have been
evicted. Both Naccesses and ni are discrete random variables.
The probability of evicting a new way becomes (n−(i−1))n . The
2We ran this experiment on an Intel i7-4790 CPU clocked at 3.60 GHz.
expected value and variance of Naccesses are
E(Naccesses) = n ·Hn V(Naccesses)≈ pi
2
6
·n2
Hn denotes the nth harmonic number. For n = 128 subcache
entries, an average of 695 memory accesses (each mapping
to a different 64B cache line) is needed to evict the subcache
with a variance of ≈ 26 951. This is comparably more than
the 512 accesses required to probe the entire typical L1 cache
if the attacker process is not isolated (see above). Moreover,
with such a large variance, significant variations in the number
of Naccesses required are expected from the mean E(Naccesses)
every time this eviction process is repeated.
6 Evaluation
Cache Size Associativity Sets
L1 64 KB 8-way associative 128
L2 256 KB 8-way associative 512
L3 4 MB 16-way associative 4096
TABLE 1: Cache hierarchy used in our evaluation
Mix Components
pov+mcf povray, mcf
lib+sje libquantum, sjeng
gob+mcf gobmk, mcf
ast+pov astar, povray
h26+gob h264ref, gobmk
bzi+sje bzip2, sjeng
h26+per h264ref, perlbench
cal+gob calculix, gobmk
pov+mcf+h26+gob povray, mcf, h264ref, gobmk
lib+sje+gob+mcf libquantum, sjeng, gobmk, mcf
TABLE 2: Benchmark mixes used in our evaluation
HYBCACHE is architecture-agnostic and applicable to x86,
ARM or RISC-V. We performed our performance evaluation
of HYBCACHE on a gem5-based [9] x86 emulator. We evalu-
ated the hardware overhead for an RTL implementation that
we implemented to extend an open-source RISC-V processor
Ariane [62]. For our prototyping, we applied HYBCACHE to
L1, L2, and LLC. We describe our evaluation results next.
6.1 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate HYBCACHE, we chose eight mixes of programs
from the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite, which are used in
the literature3 [36, 76], shown in the upper part of Table 2.
3 [76] also uses a ninth mix, dea+pov, which fails to run on gem5.
Two-Process Mixes. In order to evaluate the impact of iso-
lating one process in the context of an SMT processor, we
configure gem5 to simulate two processors connected to a sin-
gle three-level cache hierarchy, whose parameters are shown
in Table 1. The caches have the latencies used in [76].
For each mix, we first isolate one process, then the other,
and we compare the performance of those processes to a third
run in which neither process is isolated. We make either 2 or
3 of ways per set usable by the isolated execution processes.
The replacement policy for non-isolated processes is LRU.
Like in [76], we let gem5 simulate the first 10 billion instruc-
tions of each process in order to let the process initialize,
then we measure the performance of one additional billion
instructions. We measure the performance overhead as the
relative change in the instructions-per-cycle (IPC), i.e., the
ratio between instructions executed and CPU cycles required.
A positive overhead represents a decrease in performance.
Figure 4 reports the IPC overhead of each program when
running in isolation mode, while the other member of the mix
runs in normal mode, for 2 or 3 isolated ways. The geometric
mean of the positive overheads is 4.95% with 2 isolated ways
and 3.47% with 3 isolated ways, with maximum overheads
of 16% and 14% respectively for the cal+gob mix. For this
mix, the overhead is due to a significantly increased L3 cache
miss rate: the data miss rate jumps from 0.6% to 17.6%,
while the instruction miss rate increases from 2.1% to 9.0%.
The working set of calculix normally fits in L3 [36] but it
does not in the subcache, hence the higher overhead. Since
HYBCACHE is meant to protect only sensitive applications,
which can be expected to be short-lived and only constitute
a minority of the workload of a system, we consider those
overheads easily tolerable. Figure 5 reports the IPC overhead
for the member of the mix that is not isolated. In all cases the
IPC overhead is not positive, i.e., the IPC is equal or better
than the baseline, thus showing that HYBCACHE does not
degrade the performance of non-isolated processes.
Four-Process Mixes. To demonstrate scalability, we also
ran four-process mixes, shown in the bottom part of Table 2.
We configured gem5 with four cores; two cores share an L1
and L2 cache, the other two cores share one additional L1
and L2, while L3 is shared by all cores. Isolated execution
can use two ways per set. We isolated each member of the
two mixes (the first eight bars in Figure 6), while the other
three processes were running normally. Each isolated process
has an overhead similar to that reported in the two-process
mix experiments in Figure 4. Moreover, we also isolated two
processes in each mix (last two columns in Figure 6). In this
case, we measured increased overheads by up to 2 additional
percentage points due to the additional competition for the
subcache. However, those overheads are still easily tolerable
given the security benefits and that they are only incurred by
the isolated execution.
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FIGURE 4: IPC overhead of each isolated process when 2 or
3 ways are available to isolated execution. Each pair of bars
refers to a specific 2-process mix: the uppercase benchmark
is isolated and the other is not.
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FIGURE 5: IPC overhead of each process when the other
member of the mix is isolated. Each pair of bars refers to a
specific 2-process mix: the uppercase benchmark is isolated
and the other is not.
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nisolated NAND2X1 Gates Memory Overhead (Kb)
32 6114 0.34
64 12219 0.68
128 24563 1.3
256 48796 2.75
512 97830 5.5
1024 201792 11
2048 458300 22
TABLE 3: Logic and memory overhead estimates for fully-
associative lookup of 46-bit addresses for different numbers
of isolated cache ways (in any cache level).
6.2 Hardware and Memory Overhead
HYBCACHE requires additional hardware and memory for
the fully-associative lookup of the subcache entries. We im-
plemented the RTL for HYBCACHE and evaluated it for the
hardware overhead for different number of isolated cache
ways as shown in Table 3, irrespective of which cache levels
this is applied to. While the overhead of the additional hard-
ware is non-negligible, it is reasonable for a fully-associative
cache lookup. Nevertheless, it diminishes in perspective with
an 8-core Xeon Nehalem [1] of 2,300,000,000 transistors, for
example. The logic overhead of HYBCACHE for 2048 fully-
associative ways lookup is estimated at 1,833,200 transistors
(NAND2X1 count× 4) which is 0.07% overhead to the Xeon
Nehalem. For an 8-way 128-set cache, the memory overhead
in our PoC for fully-associative mapping is 7 additional tag
bits + 4 IDID bits per cache way. With respect to access la-
tencies, the exact timing latency of lookups will eventually
depend on the circuit routing but, in principle, for a paral-
lel content-addressable memory lookup (as in our hardware
PoC), accesses are performed in 2 clock cycles.
7 Discussion
Design and Implementation Aspects. HYBCACHE relies
on a random-replacement cache policy combined with full-
associativity to provide its dynamic isolation guarantees. The
implementation of the random replacement policy is dele-
gated to the hardware designer and considered an orthogonal
problem. Cryptographically-secure pseudo-random number
generators (CSPRNG) or even true hardware random number
generators can be used and the seed can be changed as often
as required. The output of the CSPRNG cannot be predicted
if it is seeded with secret randomness at the start of every pro-
cess. When the seed is changed, re-keying management tasks
such as cache flushing and invalidation for the re-mapping
are not required, unlike in recent architectures [63, 74]. This
is because in HYBCACHE the randomness is only used for
selection of the victim cache line, and not for locating exist-
ing cache lines in the subcache. Furthermore, we emphasize
that CSPRNG design and implementations are an orthogonal
problem to our work.
The "soft" cache partitioning of HYBCACHE is a generic
concept and can be applied, in principle, to any set-associative
structure. In this work, we apply it to the L1, L2, and L3
(LLC) caches, but it can also be applied selectively to only
some of these cache levels or to the TLB as well, or to only
some cache levels in only one or more cores in a multi-core
architecture that become dedicated for allocating isolated ex-
ecution. The choice of which cache structures to apply this to
and how many ways to isolate in the subcache is delegated
to the hardware designer, given that it is a more complex de-
sign decision with other metrics and trade-offs that come into
play such as the size of the structure, power consumption,
and logic overhead. The power consumption and timing over-
heads associated with building and routing a fully-associative
cache lookup in VLSI are significant, but can be alleviated
by leveraging emerging hybrid memory technologies such as
DRAM-based caches [48] and STT-MRAM caches [30, 31].
In practice, applying HYBCACHE to the LLC or larger caches
in general would be more expensive (in terms of hardware)
than L1 and L2 caches, and strict partitioning might be ap-
plied instead for the LLC. Nevertheless, HYBCACHE can
be, in principle, applied to sliced Intel LLCs. In each slice,
a number of cache ways (subcache) is reserved for isolated
execution. Any mapping from the IDID to the LLC slices
can be used, such that lines from a particular IDID are allo-
cated to a specific slice. Fully-associative lookups are thus
only be performed on the subcache portion of a single slice,
thus reducing the performance overheads and allowing scal-
ing to high-core-count processors. The slice-mapping would
be based only on the IDID, and thus it would not leak any
information about the data address or value.
Other design decisions in HYBCACHE include the number
of bits designated for IDID and thus the maximum number of
concurrent isolation domains supported (see Section 4.4). To
support more isolation domains (not concurrently) than the
hardwired maximum, the cache lines of one domain can be
flushed by the kernel or microcode at context switching while
the next domain is switched in and is re-assigned the available
IDID. Nevertheless, supporting too many isolation domains
will result in increased cache utilization, and the overall per-
formance will suffer. This is in line with conventional cache
behavior, but is aggravated in HYBCACHE because isolated
execution is only allowed to utilize the subcache portion.
However, this violates our working assumption A2 that only
the minority of the workload requires cache-level isolation.
We emphasize that cache-based side-channel leakage di-
rectly results from the design of the cache microarchitecture
and, thus, it is reasonable to investigate the fundamental mi-
croarchitectural designs of caches for upcoming processor
designs. While this does not address the problem for legacy
systems, it provides an exploratory ground of ideas for upcom-
ing processor designs. HYBCACHE is architecture-agnostic
and can be integrated with any processor architecture (we
simulated it for x86 and implemented it for RISC-V). It is
also compliant with any set-associative cache architecture in-
dependent of its hierarchy and organization, and whether it is
virtually or physically indexed since no indexing is involved.
Intra-Process Isolation Support. HYBCACHE can also
be extended, in principle, to provide fine-grained run-time
configuration of the isolation domain within a process, e.g.,
between different threads within the same process. Besides
kernel support, this requires an instruction extension to en-
able isolation of particular code regions or threads to different
IDIDs or disable isolation altogether at run-time (reset its
run-time IDID to all-zero). However, this requires the devel-
oper to identify and annotate security-sensitive code regions.
Nevertheless, this is useful in practice since a process might
not require cache-based side-channel resilience for its entirety
but only for sensitive code such as cryptographic computa-
tions. This is a more generalizable approach that is easier and
more directly applicable than implementing leakage-resilient
variants for security/privacy-sensitive computations.
Deployment Assumptions. HYBCACHE assumes any
TEE or trusted computing environment that is leveraged in
compliance with their original design intent, i.e., that the
much larger portion of the execution workload is not security-
critical and only a smaller portion is security-critical and
isolated in an I-Domain (A2). Otherwise, if the workload
is equally balanced, the isolated execution subset would be
restricted to a smaller partition of the cache and would in-
cur a more than tolerable performance degradation especially
if it is cache-sensitive. For HYBCACHE to be optimally ad-
vantageous, the workload distribution and allocation must be
performed by the administrator such that the right balance of
overall security and performance is achieved, as shown by the
performance results in Section 6.1.
8 Related Work
We describe next the state of the art in existing defenses and
their shortcomings that HYBCACHE overcomes.
8.1 Partitioning
Cache partitioning allocates to each process or security do-
main a separate partition of the cache, hence guaranteeing
strict non-interference. Both software-based [20, 40, 51, 82]
and hardware-based [24,41,72,73] partitioning schemes have
been proposed in recent years, where partitioning is either
process-based or region-based.
Process-based partitioning. Godfrey [20] implements
process-based cache partitioning using page coloring on Xen,
which incurs a prohibitive performance overhead with increas-
ing number of processes. SecDCP [72] is a way-partitioning
scheme where each application is assigned a security class
and cache partitioning between the security classes is dynam-
ically managed according to the cache demand of non-secure
applications. SecDCP is not scalable; selective cache flushing
and repartitioning is required if the number of security classes
exceeds that of allocated partitions and it may perform worse
than static partitioning. Furthermore, both schemes do not
support the use of shared libraries. CacheBar [82] periodically
configures the maximum number of ways allocated to each
process which unfairly impacts performance and cache uti-
lization, and does not scale well with the number of security
domains. DAWG [41] partitions the caches where different
processes are assigned to different protection domains isolat-
ing cache hits and misses. The aforementioned schemes incur
the performance overhead for the entire code, whereas HYB-
CACHE only enables side-channel resilience and the resulting
performance overhead only for the isolated execution.
Sanctum [14] protects TEEs by flushing private caches
whenever the processor switches between enclave mode and
normal mode and partitioning of the LLC and assigning to
each enclave a static number of sets. Sets allocated to an
enclave can be used exclusively by the enclave and cannot be
utilized by the OS. On the contrary, HYBCACHE allows for
a flexible and dynamic sharing of cache resources between
processes (thus improving performance), while preserving
cache side-channel resilience for isolated execution.
Many cache partitioning and allocation schemes [37, 55,
64, 65, 75] have been proposed that focus on cache alloca-
tion mechanisms aiming to improve performance for multi-
core caches. However, such schemes do not provide security
guarantees. HYBCACHE addresses the security/performance
trade-off by providing a configurable means to enable the side-
channel resilience only for isolated execution while providing
non-isolated execution with unaltered performance.
Region-based partitioning. These approaches split the
cache into a secure partition reserved for security/privacy-
critical memory pages and a non-secure partition for the
remaining memory pages. STEALTHMEM [40] uses page
coloring where several pages are colored and reserved for
security-sensitive data and they remain locked in cache. CAT-
alyst [51] leverages Intel’s CAT (Cache Allocation Technol-
ogy) [3] to divide the cache into secure and non-secure par-
titions and uses page coloring within the secure partition to
isolate different processes’ cache accesses to these pages.
PLcache [73] locks cache lines and allocates them exclusively
to particular processes such that the cache line can only be
evicted by its process. However, overall performance and
fairness of cache utilization are strongly impacted as the pro-
tected memory size increases in relevance to the total cache
capacity. Moreover, with PLcache an attacker process may
still infer the victim’s memory accesses by observing that it
is unable to access or evict cache lines (locked by a victim
process) from a particular cache set.
Cloak [24] uses hardware transactional memory, such as In-
tel TSX [2], to protect sensitive computations by pre-loading
the security-critical code and data into the cache at the begin-
ning of the transaction and any cache line evictions are de-
tected by the transaction aborting. Cloak incurs prohibitively
high performance overhead for memory-intense computations
and requires the developer’s strong involvement to identify
and instrument security-sensitive code and split it into sev-
eral transactions. Recent works have also explored the LLC
inclusion property for defense schemes such as RIC [39] and
SHARP [76]. However, both are architecture-specific, RIC
requires coherence protocol modifications and cache flushing
on thread migration, while SHARP requires modifications to
the clflush instruction. HYBCACHE, however, is architecture-
agnostic, and does not require cache flushing or modifications
to coherence protocols or the clflush instruction.
8.2 Randomization
Introducing randomization involves introducing noise or de-
liberate slowdown to the system clock to hinder the accuracy
of timing measurements as in FuzzyTime [32] and Time-
Warp [57]. These techniques can only defeat attacks which
rely on measuring access latency, but cannot prevent other
attacks such as alias-driven attacks [28]. They compromise
the precision of the clock for the remaining workload, thus
affecting functionality requirements.
RPCache [73] randomizes the mapping of all memory lines
of a protected application at a per-set granularity from their
actual cache set to a randomly mapped cache set, by using a
permutation table. NewCache [53] randomizes the mapping at
a per-line granularity using a Random Mapping Table. Both
RPCache and NewCache schemes do not scale well with
the number of lines in the cache (not applicable for larger
LLCs) and the number of protected domains. Random Fill
Cache [52] mitigates only reuse-based cache collision attacks
by replacing deterministic fetching with randomly filling the
cache within a configurable neighborhood window whose
size impacts the performance degradation incurred. It does
not scale well with an increasing TEE size.
Time-Secure Cache [69] uses a set-associative cache in-
dexed with a keyed function using the cache line address and
Process ID as its input. However, a weak low-entropy index-
ing function is used, thus re-keying is frequently required
followed by cache flushing which requires complex manage-
ment and impacts performance. CEASER [63] also uses a
keyed indexing function but without the Process ID, thus also
requiring frequent re-keying of its index derivation function
and re-mapping to limit the time interval for an attack. A con-
current work, ScatterCache [74], uses keyed cryptographic
indexing that depends on the security domain, where cache
set indexing is different and pseudo-random for every domain
but consistent for any given key. Thus, re-keying may still
be required at time intervals to hinder the profiling and ex-
ploitation efforts of an adversary attempting to construct and
use an eviction set to collide with the victim access of inter-
est. HYBCACHE, on the other hand, leverages randomization
by disabling set-associativity altogether and using random
replacement for isolated execution. Every given memory ad-
dress can be cached in any of the available subcache ways and
placement is random and unpredictable; it varies randomly
every time the same memory line is brought in cache.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a generic mechanism for flexi-
ble and "soft" partitioning of set-associative memory struc-
tures and applied it to multi-core caches, which we call HY-
BCACHE. HYBCACHE effectively thwarts contention-based
and access-based cache attacks by selectively applying side-
channel-resilient cache behavior only for code in isolated
execution domains (e.g., TEEs). Meanwhile, non-isolated ex-
ecution continues to utilize unaltered and conventional cache
behavior, capacity and performance. This addresses the persis-
tent performance/security trade-off with caches by providing
the additional side-channel resilience guarantee, and the re-
sulting performance degradation, only for the security-critical
execution subset of the workload (usually isolated in a TEE)
by eliminating the fundamental causes of these attacks. We
evaluated HYBCACHE with the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark
and show a performance overhead of up to 5% for isolated
execution and no overhead for the non-isolated execution.
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